In the late 1980s, the capitalist experiment erupted in the newly democratic countries of Central Europe and the former Soviet Union. Considering the relevance of this experiment, it has soon become a privileged subject of research. Among others, the formation of new social classes, which have replaced the nomenklatura, and the conduct of economic policy are favored topics. Eyal, Szelényi, and Townsley (2000) (henceforth EST) and Zloch-Christy (2000) (henceforth ZC) have analyzed the spheres in which transformation exerted the most striking effects: the social aspect of transformation and the ideological monetary approach to reforms. Not damaging the specific conclusions raised by these scholars, a critical evaluation of the books from a broader perspective than they employ seems in order.
Institutions and Character of the Communist System.
New political institutions such as parliaments and governments spread all across the former communist system. They appeared to operate through free elections and routine designations. This belief turned out to be entirely false. Central planners thought they could give the community high and equally distributed incomes without class struggle. However, such an ambitious project was not achieved at all. By the end of the 1980s, the whole system imploded and with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 left its indelible mark.
Two aspects are worthy of note. First, the Soviet system was autocratic in character. Although in Central Europe autocracy had to comply with Soviet ideology, ideas of a second society and parallel politics began to appear in the 1970s and intensified in the 1980s.
The spirit of this second society and of the dissident intellectuals was to reverse communism and steer the domestic system toward capitalism without capitalists. This could have been possible by lending more importance to civil society and the economic managerial rationalism that had permeated the system even before 1989. Hence, the crisis of legitimation that occurred in Central Europe and Yugoslavia slowed the emergence of a developing embryonic noncommunist civil society (Holmes 1997) . The second aspect refers to the technocrats working at international economic organizations and experts advocating free market ideology who felt qualified to shape the course of domestic reforms. People of the "Marriott brigade" carried out this agenda of economic reform (Rutland 1997 ) with neoconservative think-tank "missionaries" (Nove 1996) : they introduced liberalization, stabilization, and privatization as working substitutes for previous paternalistic governance (Sergi 2003) . Only the malevolence of economic experts can declare these principles fallacious in today's internationalized world. Nevertheless, a better specification of sequences and more social-domestic targeted options could have eased the transition, creating a more effective process of Westernization. In the end, the World Bank criticized some methods of past policies, and in the recent past János Kornai (2000) felt that he had been too optimistic in his previous predictions of economic growth.
The Subjects Analyzed in the Two Books
These reflections, which bridge the space between autocracy and liberalism and a partially deceptive economic transformation, stimulate a critical reading of the two books under review. The first step is to anchor them firmly to the social dimension of transformation. These "waves" of democratization caused the collapse and the rebuilding of institutions that were designed to emulate those that operate in advanced markets (pathdependence theory) or rather upon the ruins of past institutions (involutionary theory). On this specific point, EST advance an alternative "trajectory adjustment." A path-dependent approach merges with the capability of learning from precommunist ways of doing business on the ground that the habit of the immediate past was not appropriate to alter the new circumstances.
Following this perspective, EST break down the development in Eastern Europe into the Russian case on one side and the economies of Central Europe on the other. They describe the transformation from the monolithic structured system, a state of affairs that I define as state capitalism, to a setting in which technocrats attempt to construct a society of capitalists and capitalist ideology. Out of the socialist experiment that forbade the existence of capitalism and capitalists in their purest form, the three authors importantly distinguish Russia's experience from that of Central Europe. Simply, the governance of the Russian experiment depended upon capitalists without capitalism, in contrast to Central Europe, where there is capitalism without capitalists. What came into being in Central Europe is a sort of alliance capitalism, in which the interests of all actors involved in the experiment aimed at maintaining stability. In contrast, some twenty oligarchs could control a large part of the Russian capitalist experiment and the banking system with Mafia methods (Zwass 2002) . Nevertheless, the divergent outcomes in East Central Europe deserve analysis. In this new historical context, the intelligentsia acted in a way that displaced the bourgeois class, a group that was completely missing in the communist regimes. EST depart from the classical theorists' credo that private capital accumulation is a prerequisite for a capitalist society. They definitely deny that any accumulation could occur in Central Europe, where a main task of transformation was to privatize quickly the means of production. The experience of timid market reforms in the 1980s and the absence of Russian oil resources and oligarchs allowed individuals to take private initiatives. These facts may explain the different outcomes in Central Europe with regard to capitalism and the middle class of capitalists. The institutional chaos aggravated by the fall of Gorbachev and the attempt to control the country's enormous natural resources went undisturbed: the bureaucratic-capitalist class turned into an oligarchy.
I might reinterpret these opposite outcomes as follows. First, what emerged subsequently is not surprising. The paternalistic epoch ignored the private accumulation of wealth; however, the system itself created two classes of state managers. Though these two classes were not acting as modern Schumpeterian entrepreneurs-in the Russian experience, out of 20 million communist party members, about 2 million became part of the top nomenklatura-state managers were exhibiting either managerial or political capital skills. This could explain a second fact: the transformation process originated out of past political and social distortions. The passage from one system to another was accomplished not through the transformation of a feudal society into a capitalist one but rather from a society of technocratic state capitalists and top officials into market capitalism. Thus, the Russian institutional chaos and the missing second society or middle class led to oligarchy and the striking phenomenon of the "new riches."
The second explanation for the contrasting outcomes is that capitalism has become a generic term to describe different types of capitalist economies in which socioeconomic systems show a diversity of class relations and institutional arrangements. EST interpreted class developments using Bourdieu's three types of capital, that is, economic, social, and cultural. The three types of capital are the tools for Bourdieu to describe the French social structure, in which economic capital results dominate. The postcommunism capitalist experiment developed around the intelligentsia, which acted as a substitute for economic and cultural bourgeoisies and committed itself to the cause of bourgeois society and market institutions. During these developments, technocrats won versus bureaucrats. A fresh middle-level management emerged (in contrast to a middle-level class); it possessed the political and cultural capital developed over decades of paternalism without an accumulation of economic capital that was prohibited. Part of the former class of political capitalists suffered downward mobility ("surprising" EST). Moreover, the oligarchs used their accumulated political and cultural capital to take control of the economy. A new capitalist society was formed in which a weak bourgeoisie and a strong state characterized the whole period. In the specific experience of Central Europe, cultural capital dominated but technocrats had to join what EST term the new "politocracy" and opinion-making intellectual elites to form a strong bloc of power. Nevertheless, the degeneration of the system resulted not simply in the transformation and adaptation of a new social class to the new state of affairs but in the complexity of a market experiment that reformers quickly created, supported for a long time by the intelligentsia, to allow them to use their inherited wealth (political and cultural). The book edited by ZC deals with the ideological monetary approach. Contributors from academia and central banks interpreted the challenges of the passage from a paternalistic system to one where market forces were guided by the "monetary" strategy of a currency board (in the Baltic region and Bulgaria) and the so-called "Washington consensus" (Korhonen et al., chap. 3; Pautola, chap. 4). A new market-oriented approach imposed measures to promote price stability-the hyperinflation phenomena appeared in Poland (1990) , Yugoslavia (1990) , and Bulgaria (in fall 1996 and early 1997)-and to fix firmly the ultimate need for macroeconomic stabilization. Under currency board arrangements, domestic central banks had to follow a monetary discipline, trying to restrain inflationary pressures or prevent future crisis. This is a return to a gold standard and a fixed exchange rate regime, which receives a rather mixed assessment in this book (ZC, conclusion). Kolodko (chap. 1) debated the outcomes of the transformation and introduced the need for firmer institutional building. In fact, institutional building was lacking in the 1990s. Nevertheless, if a strategy of institutional building advocated by Kolodko had put reforms on the proper track, the Bulgarian experience of a currency board arrangement would have weakened a good overall economic strategy, resulting in more harm than good (ZC, chap. 7). Besides currency boards, Cooper (chap. 2) found that the countries that moved quickest to achieve convertibility have done economically better than those that pursued more restrictive policies. A hasty move toward convertibility did not turn out to have disadvantageous effects.
The books highlight the two most critical methodological frameworks of discussion, the social aspect and the monetarist ideology, which permits an analysis of the role of managerial brainpower in postcommunist society. If developments cemented the diverse functions of the elite into a hegemonic bloc, reformers implemented monetary policies and budgetary restraints, which international economic organizations and economists preferred. What is lacking in the books is an analytical framework for a regional perspective of understanding. Soon after these states got economic and political freedom, they became interconnected internationally, involved in a broader "game" made up of a transnational culture of entrepreneurial skills and effective competition, encompassing not only the economic sphere but also democratic institutions. A consideration of the coming enlargement of the European Union, including Central European countries, and the efforts to raise standards of living would enhance the analysis.
The Logic behind Reforms
My reconstruction combines the sociological and economic aspects of transformation into a "Janus" perspective: concerning the past, the abjuring of communism by modern reformers; concerning the future, the adoption of free market ideology and market competition, which are likely to increase. In what follows, the two perspectives mix in a coherent social and economic theoretical account. EST rightly broach the issue of the social evolution of postcommunist societies, where some classes lost whilst others won. Though nowadays those struggles take place in an evolving context, in Russian history it was common to have class struggle and the accompanying defeat and victory. However, the credo of price stability is not new at all, as central planners believed in the virtuousness of stable prices for basic goods, a steady money supply growth, and low deficits. The increase in the prices of meat and milk produced serious public outcry in the early 1960s, but a stable communist economy and a strong social class (nomenklatura) were able to dominate, steering the system toward a steady state. A permanent bureaucratic class dampened the emergence of a middle class, which was the peculiar aspect in Western societies.
As things are developing, these economies are searching for a new social rationale. This is the rationale for the search for an improvement in living standards and free institutions. The results can be seen in new elites of capitalists and in the application of the strongest measures of capitalist regulation, which imposed stability in the 1990s through either currency boards or tight monetary policy, rather than with planning. Nevertheless, the transition from one social situation to another has not been easy and has produced far-reaching distortions. The technocratic component of the new elite was only partially accustomed to Western-type practices. As it happened, some of the powerful people lost favor to a group of young communist technocrats who had created a form of managerial capitalism using state property and the bureaucracy. They obtained the means of power through political and cultural dominance, preserving some 80 to 90 percent of their positions in economic and land management (Tsyganov 1999) . Simply, they have not squandered their political and economic gains and have found enough power to maneuver themselves to control important resources and maintain support within the political establishment. They constitute a new class of capitalists able to implement decisive monetarist strategy despite the distress caused by the stringency of reforms.
The currency boards reduced the severity of the crisis, stabilized the systems, and integrated domestic economies into world markets. This process now requires rebuilding international strategic alliances and opening domestic markets to foreign capital, while society continues to suffer the ill effects. Undoubtedly, the early reforms provoked a complete economic downfall. This was visible even at the end of the 1990s as GDP fell. In the former Soviet Union, Polanyi's (1944) description of distribution systems of reciprocity and of markets seems appropriate. Informal practices in Russia were based on forms of reciprocity and barter (see Humphrey 2002) , but recent developments suggest cautious signals of recovery and the strengthening of market strategies. The Russian economy has embraced a solid market strategy, and this fact may have laid down the basis for the formation of an oligarchy and new relationships in European regional markets.
This economic experiment suffered from the uncertainty of the timing of economic strategies and the resolution of social conflicts. Still, the true answer may not be Plato's question about which social class ought to rule a country or, indirectly, to which economic ideology reformers should adhere. The question still revolves around how market forces may harmoniously create a balanced transition, reduce social class conflicts, and maintain an eye on the international scene.
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And this is not all. It would be an exaggeration to claim a complete absence of capitalists in Central and Eastern Europe for two reasons. First, the transformation was not occurring abruptly, and the regimes allowed some private enterprises during the 1980s. Second, the formation of a class of state managers and a class of young entrepreneurs (managers and central bankers) can trace back to the previous paternalistic structure. This class of new managers forms a vital component in the society of today, though the chaotic situation may have transformed political and managerial capital into a hegemonic oligarchy. Nevertheless, messy circumstances of corruption and inequalities were also extensive in an early stage of capitalism in Europe, the United States, and the Pacific Rim (Hough 2001) . The transformation has heightened in East Central Europe with serious social consequences, and major rearrangements among classes, to fit the new economic context.
As for the second "Janus" perspective, the admission to the European Union implies a European class of capitalists that can innovate and take advantage of the regional dimension of commodity and capital flows. The authors, in the end, are optimistic about the new European dimension of business and even broader transnational interconnections. That is why I prefer to reinforce this perspective espousing the "Brussels consensus" (Sergi 2003) . In the new European regional context, one has to be aware of the strategic function of the European Union as a major actor in steering economic and institutional advancement. The "Brussels consensus" could serve to shape an innovative economy specifically targeted toward advancing democracy, security, and freedom-a setting in which present attempts in social class advancement and political economy may be channeled into a more sensible social framework and a more stable institutional structure. This will be a setting in which capitalism does not fade away but one in which these new market economies have to coexist under the European monetary and budgetary rules.
